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1999] MONEY, MARRIAGE & TAXATION
believe, however, that the individual return is fairer, simpler, more
efficient, and more in accord with basic tax principles than the joint
return.
PROF. THOMAS: Thank you, Marjorie.
Our next panelist is Diana Furchtgott-Roth, also an economist
and a Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. She is
going to talk to us about a different solution to the problem of
marriage penalties. Her topic is: "Eliminating the Marriage Penalty
Through Flatter Taxation."
ELIMINATING THE MARRIAGE PENALTY THROUGH FLATTER TAXATION
Diana Furchtgott-Roth
MS. FURCHTGOTT-ROTH: Suppose your parents offered
you $50,000 on the condition that you get married. Would you be
more likely to marry? Likewise, if they offered you a similar amount
not to marry, would you be more inclined to live in sin? Today Uncle
Sam is bribing some of us and penalizing others for these very
decisions.
The tax code is replete with marriage bonuses and marriage
penalties that the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 worsened.57 As we
think about filing our tax returns by April 15th, it's no wonder that tax
reform, again, tops the agenda, since the bribes and penalties have
turned the Code into an accountant's dream. Take the marriage
penalty. As we have heard today, it has been extensively documented
that two working people face higher tax rates if married than if they
are single (there are about 22 million such couples).58 On the other
side of the coin is the marriage bonus, which is Uncle Sam's bribe to
57 See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, 1I1 Stat. 788.
58 See David Hess, House Opts To Take Ax To Budget, Taxes; In Exchange
for Votes, GOP Moderates Receive Promises From Party Leaders; Budget: House Votes
for Big Cuts, SALT LAKE TRIB., June 6, 1998, at A I (discussing a House budget plan that
cut federal spending by $101 million).
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get married. The marriage bonus is actually more prevalent than the
marriage penalty, as June O'Neill pointed out. There are about 26
million couples who are in the bonus position.5 9
Data from the Congressional Budget Office for 1996 shows
that almost no low income couples receive marriage penalties, while
such penalties affect more than half of the couples whose top earner
makes between $30,000 and $85,000.60 The same data shows that
almost all couples whose top earner earns less than $5,000 receive the
marriage bonus.6' The present value of these bribes and penalties is
significant.
I am going to discuss a series of calculations that were done
by me and my colleague, Kevin Hassett, also an economist at the
American Enterprise Institute. These calculations show the present
value of the marriage penalties and bonuses for all tax paying couples,
assuming a 2 percent real income growth on a 4 percent real interest
rate. They illustrate for each income, how much money you would
have to receive today to pay all future marriage penalties or cancel out
future bonuses.
59 See Proposal to Reduce Taxes, supra note 4.
61 See id.
61 See id.
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Those couples whose top earner makes $20,000 and who are
objects of Uncle Sam's penalties face an average lifetime loss of
income of almost $70,000. Those who are the in the same bracket but
who are eligible for the bonus receive an average lifetime bribe of
$46,000. As incomes increase, the numbers become ridiculously
high. The average lifetime penalty to couples whose highest earner
makes about $100,000 is $195,000 and the average bonus is about
$146,000.
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 left the bribe unaffected, but
worsened the penalty significantly. The allegedly family-friendly
provisions in the new bill consisted of tax credits for children and
education and savings incentives, which phase out over different
income levels. 62 Income levels are, naturally, higher for married
couples than for singles. However, even when phase-outs for singles
are half of the amounts of phase-outs for married couples, divorce
62 See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, sec. III Stat. 788
(1997) (to be codified as 26 U.S.C. § 24(a) and (c)).
Figure 1: Percent of Couples with Marriage Penalty or Bonus
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provides a tax advantage because women tend to have lower incomes
than men, allowing them to take advantage of the new programs.
The list of such family adversarial provisions is quite long.
The $500 Child Credit that actually comes 'into effect this year (last
year it was $400) starts phasing out at $110,000 for married couples,
but at $75,000 for singles 63 ,A family of four earning $130,000 is
ineligible for that credit, but two household members making $65,000
each qualify. 64 Consider the Hope Scholarship, a $1,500 college tax
credit for freshmen and sophomores and the $1,000 Lifetime Learning
Credit, which can be used for substantive education. 65 These begin to
phase out at $40,000 for singles and $80,000 for married couples.
They amount to a gain of $2,500 in tax credits for a family with two
children in college. The $1,000 deduction for interest on student
loans phases out at $40,000 for singles and $60,000 for married
couples. 66 In addition, as noted earlier, there are. even more severe
and prevalent phase-outs for the Earned Income Tax Credit. 67  The
EITC, because it is so income and circumstances dependent, is
difficult for me to outline here. However, the number of people in
those circumstances is extremely large. $1,000 here and $1,000 there
soon add up.
Several bills in the 1 0 5th Congress proposed to solve the
marriage penalty problem by allowing married couples to choose
whether to file as singles or as married couples. 68 This would cost
63 See id.; see also Heidi Glenn, List of Tax Expenditures Grows Again, JCT
Report Shows, TAX NOTES TODAY, Jan. 2, 1998 availble in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT
file (discussing the impact of the Joint Committee of Taxation report).
64 See Taxpayer Relief Act, § 24(b).
65 See Gary Klott, Your Taxes: New Credits Loom in 2000 if You Pay Tuition
this Fall, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Sept. 13, 1999 (discussing the various tax credits that
may be available next year to those paying college tuition this fall).
66 See Gary Klott, Use College Write-Offs as Way to Reduce Taxes, FT.
LAUDERDALE SuN-SENTINEL, Sept. 6, 1999 (discussing the various tax credits that may be
available next year to those paying college tuition).
67 See Max B. Sawicky, Plenty of Nothing in Fed Budget Plans, NEWSDAY,
Oct. 4, 1998 (noting the year's surplus budget and the effects of the suggested tax
proposal by the United States House of Representatives).
68 See H.R. 2462, 105th Cong. (1997) (amending Internal Revenue Code to
allow married tax payers to use tax rates applicable to single filers or joint filers); see also
S. 593, 105th Cong. (1997) (amending Internal Revenue Code to impose a flat tax only on
individual earning taxable income and business taxable income).
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about $29 billion annually. 69  As has been pointed out, married
couples have always been allowed to file singly. What was not
pointed out is that they do so at a higher rate, making this something
new. This proposal would give a different rate or the same rate as
before, and would cost about $29 billion. Others suggest income
splitting between couples, whereby couples would divide their
earnings in two akin to the old community property laws that were in
place decades ago in some states.70 Even if one spouse did not earn
any income, he or she then would file as singles. Some estimate this
proposal at about $36 billion a year.71  Those proposals would
eliminate the marriage penalty and the second, income splitting
between couples, would result in a marriage bonus. Of course, with
frequent complaints about decaying social norms, the marriage bonus
may not be such a bad idea. Just as for parents, bribing youngsters to
get good grades might work in some cases. We need to ask ourselves
whether the goal of tax policy should be to encourage various forms
of behavior or simply to allow individuals to make their own
decisions. Naturally, if restoring marriage is an important social goal,
then a proposal to allow income splitting between couples is a means
toward that objective. However, with a price tag of $36 billion
perhaps there are better ways to allocate the revenue.
69 See David Ivanovich, Marriage Tax Twist, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 11,
1998 (discussing the present 'marriage penalty," history relating to it, and the costs of
eradicating it).
70 See Deborah Moon, Virtual Estate Plans in the New Millennium,- J. FIN.
SERVICE PROF., Sept. 1, 1999 (discussing marriage, community property laws, income
splitting and taxes); see also The Economy Perspective Marriage, Taxes, and Fairness,
INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Jan. 27, 1998 (discussing the marriage penalty and income
splitting).
71 See Diana Furchtgottroth & Kevin Hassett, Tax Code Penalizes Work, Not
Marriage, INVESTOR'S Bus. DAILY, Jan. 16, 1998 (discussing the marriage penalty and
income splitting).
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Figure 2: Present Value of Lifetime Marriage Penalties or Bonuses
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What should we do? If we move towards a flatter system of
taxation, we would get rid of the bribes and penalties in the tax code.
Then, as two earners marry, a second earner has entered the labor
market and, even as primary earners have the opportunity to increase
earnings, the family would not incur a penalty of a move towards a
higher tax bracket. In addition, Uncle Sam would be out of the
bribery business.
Thank you.
PROF. THOMAS: We now will turn to the questions. To start
off, I have a couple of questions, and the panelists may also want to
speak to each other.
The broad question, which I would like to ask each of you
about, is whether you think that one model of taxation should be
adopted for all married couples? One of the features of the current
wave of legislative proposals is that everything is being offered on an
elective basis. You can pick between the joint return, as it stands, or
one of these other options. You can choose to file a combined return
158 [Vol. XVI
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with tax computed on an individual basis or you can choose to file
joint returns. Clearly, the couple is allowed to choose the cheapest tax
system under these proposals, the system that would result in the
lowest tax burden." The question that this approach raises for me is
whether there is not a correct way to tax married couples, based on
our knowledge of economic behavior and ideas of equity. Should we
be making taxation something about which individual couples can
make their own choices?
Perhaps this is an interesting but extreme way of thinking
about behavior and efficiency. If you give people the choice of
designing their own marriages and then picking their own system of
taxation to match it, maybe that is the most efficient and therefore the
most preferable. However, is that the correct way to go about
designing the unit of taxation? What happens to the concept of
equity?
PROF. WHITTINGTON: One thing that I think we need to
consider when we have proposals such as that, given the choice of
joint versus single filing, is that it is potentially a quite costly,
disruptive, and administratively inefficient. The compliance costs that
we introduce is also potentially large because, essentially, people must
calculate their taxes twice in order to determine under which scenario
they would be better off. If we are going to think about the entire cost
of a change in the tax system, we need to think not only about changes
in revenues but changes in administrative and compliance costs,
which would be quite large.
My bias is toward our resolving this, in terms of a society, by
deciding what we think are the essential principles of the tax system.
As Diana Furchtgott-Roth said, "what is the goal of the tax system?"
Then we need to address that goal, rather than have a potpourri or
smorgasbord approach to how we will tax families in this country. I,
personally, do not have the answer for what is the correct system
because that is a decision of society.
PROF. THOMAS: Marjorie?
PROF. KORNHAUSER: I think we ought to have taxation of
individuals, not joint returns. As I indicated, I don't think the joint
72 See Ann F. Thomas, Marriage and the Income Tax Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow: A Primer and Legislative Scorecard, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1 (1999).
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return fits with our tax system, which bases taxation on ability to pay.
In an income tax that determination is usually based on who controls
the income. As Amy and I have both said, income is not shared
equally within a family. Consequently, you have theoretical reasons
to use the individual as the taxable unit. If the goal is to have the
taxable unit promote "family values," then we need to examine the
real meaning of that phrase. The government's role is to promote the
"general welfare." In that context, family values means nurturing
people, supporting them emotionally and financially, teaching moral
and ethical values, and keeping them off Welfare. If you want to do
that, the marriage unit is way too narrow or under-inclusive. There
are all kinds of groups - such as married and unmarried couples,
three elderly sisters living together, a religious commune - which
can provide the support function. As such, the taxable unit should be
much broader if all you are concerned about is"family values."
In fact in May 1999, the French legislature enacted a provision
that would allow two people, regardless of sex, to get social and
political privileges.73 This privilege includes the privilege of filing a
joint return, so long as they filed a certificate and lived a life of
"common interest." This would allow two sisters, for example, who
live together to file joint returns. Why they narrow it to two and not
three or four, I am not sure. Most industrialized countries do not use a
married couple or family as the taxable unit. Two-thirds of the
Organization for European Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries use the individual as the unit. Obviously, it can be done
from an administrative standpoint. In fact, even the United States
allows individuals to file separately. It would be more efficient if
everyone files singly than to have couples elect whether to file jointly
or individually as some of the bills permit
PROF. SCHWARTZ: I agree with both of you, but my
concern, about the way things are done now and about moving to a
system where we have choices, is that we are now trying to do more
with the tax code. When we say we would like to have marriage
neutrality, horizontal equity and progressive taxation, and we are
adding another series of objectives, the problem becomes that we only
have one instrument. The basic solution would be to move toward
73 See Daley, supra note 39, at 21.
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individual taxation. Once we have achieved that, then think about
what we are giving up by having individual taxation, and attempt to
reconcile those issues directly. For example, there was a time when
doing income support for poor people was not fashionable, so people
did not want to do things through expenditure programs and it became
attractive to do things through the tax code.74 There are a lot of
different things we are trying to do, all within one system.
MS. FURCHTGOTT-ROTH: Complexity is a heavily
weighted factor with many people in filing tax returns, as you can see
from the growth of H & R Block and other such services. When we
talk about choices in how to file tax returns, we need to remember that
we already have a lot of choices in how much tax we pay. For
example, one can get a mortgage that lowers one's taxes, versus
renting a house. If we have stocks and we choose to sell them, then
we pay capital gains. The number of children we have affects the tax
we pay as well.
Also, allowing people to file jointly or singly would change
families' marginal effective tax rate, so it would not really be a
choice. There would be one lowest-cost tax that they would be paying
by doing one or the other and they would never choose the highest tax
rate. It would' be basically lowering taxes. Indeed, you would
encourage a certain type of behavior. As such, we would, again, be
lowering taxes for certain kinds of behavior. That is a tax policy
choice. If we want to encourage marriage, then we choose a
"marriage bonus" plan. It is not as though anyone chooses to pay
more tax. That is not really a choice; it is just another calculation you
would go through in order to choose the lowest rate for your particular
set of circumstances.
What I am proposing is that we attempt to eliminate all of
these bells and whistles and go to something like a flatter tax, say
about 22 percent. Or simply go back to 1986, go back to the future,
the 1986 system of two rates (15 and 28 percent). 75 This system
74 See Donna Shalala, Care for Caregivers, WASH. POST, Jan. 19, 1999
(discussing a proposed bill that would provide benefits to the disabled).
75 See Leonard E. Burman, ct al., Six Tax Laws Later: How Individuals'
Marginal Federal Income Tax Rates Changed Between 1980 and 1995, 51 NAT'L TAX J.
637 (1998) (documenting the development of tax rates from 1980 to 1995).
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produced a lot of income growth and reduced complexity.7 6 We did it
then and can do it now. It is very feasible. Such a plan would
simplify the system and reduce marriage penalties and bonuses.
PROF. WHITTINGTON: I have always thought it 9 dd that we
say we want to support families so we give them a child credit. The
fact that you have given a child credit does not mean that the money is
going to be used on the child. It might be spent on the lottery or a
vacation. If your goal is to encourage specific behavior, then you
ought to do that more directly. The tax system seems to be a very
inefficient way of achieving some of those goals.
MS. FURCHTGOTT-ROTH: This Child Credit is another
example of yet another bell and whistle. Politicians like to say "We
gave you a Child Credit; we are in favor of the family; here is $500
per child." Politicians could accomplish the same thing by changing
the personal exemption, which is about $2,500 per person. They
could have asserted that they would make a $3,000 exemption for a
child. This would have eliminated a lot of the paper work and
calculations taxpayers have to do on the tax return. Instead, they say,
"Well, we want to help you; we are going to give you this amount of
money per child." This whole situation should be and could be a lot
simpler and more clear-cut than it is now.
PROF. THOMAS: I think, that's probably right, Diana, but
there is a difference between a credit and a deduction.
MS. FURCHTGOTT-ROTH: Yes, there is.
PROF. THOMAS: The credit has a fixed value for everybody
and a deduction has a greater value at higher marginal rates, although
the current Child Credit has an income ceiling and does not go all the
way up. I am not sure how much of a simplification it is if you had a
deduction rather than a credit.7
7
My next question is whether marriage bonuses are something
we should think of as part of tax expenditure. Tax expenditure budget
analysis says there is a right way to tax income and that when we
deviate from that, for economic, social, industrial, or whatever our
non-tax purposes are, we need to keep track of it because it is a form
of indirect subsidy or expenditure. Is marriage bonus, in our society,
76 See id.
7See I.R.C. § 24 (1999).
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a form of social expenditure? It is a question.
PROF. KORNHAUSER: It seems that when Congress passed
the amended innocent spouse rules it recognized that the assumption
of the joint return that sharing occurs within the marital unit is not
really so true.78 Otherwise, Congress would not have to deal with an
innocent spouse problem at all, let alone by allowing separate returns.
If that is true, then there must be some element of a tax expenditure in
the marriage bonus situation.
PROF. WHITTINGTON: We do not calculate tax
expenditures based on all the behaviors that are created through
incentives in the tax system. One would count as tax expenditures, for
instance, changes in labor supply and participation among men and
women in this country that are reactions to changes in their tax
burden. So do we then calculate the marriage bonus as a tax
expenditure when, in fact, it was, essentially, an unintended
consequence? If we now want to use it also as a social tool in order to
deliberately encourage or discourage marriage, I think that you have
to consider it as a tax expenditure. It becomes, in some senses, like
the Earned Income Tax Credit, which is deliberately structured to
encourage working behavior on the part of relatively low and low
middle income households as opposed to direct cash transfers to
them.79 As such, if we are going to use the tax system to encourage
marriage, that is a tax expenditure, that is the explicit purpose of it..
MS. FURCHTGOTT-ROTH: Such a proposal encourages
mothers to stay at home with children. As a society, we must decide
if this is a good or bad thing. For example, the Dependent Care Child
Credit helps working mothers.8 ° It might be said that, on balance, it is
not a bad idea to give stay-at-home moms a break. This is especially
true since studies show that it improves academic performance in
78 See Paul F. Wright, Taxation - Innocent Spouse Provision - of Erroneous
Deductions and Decisions - From 6013 (E) to 6015 - The Knowledge Requirement and
the Erroneous Deduction Quagmire of the Internal Revenue Code, 39 S. TEX. L. REV.
845, (1998) (stating the consequences of filing jointly and the innocent spouse provision
as provided within the Internal Revenue Code).
79 See Ignorance Can Aid Poverty, ATLANTA J., Apr. 3, 1991, at A12
(discussing the federal earned-income tax credit).
80 See Child Care Tax Credits: A Supply Side Success Story, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Aug. 8, 1989 availble in LEXIS, Fedtax Library, TNT file (discussing the tax
credit for working families).
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children and reduces drug use.8 Again, however, such a decision
depends upon our country's goals.
PROF. THOMAS: That is, by the way, a tax expenditure. The
new Child Credit is a tax expenditure.
PROF. SCHWARTZ: It is useful to think of it as a tax
expenditure if what we are thinking about is the alternative uses for
the money. If it is not going to inform a particular decision, it is not
particularly interesting. On the other hand, if we are going to ask
whether this is the way that we are going to work to encourage
marriage and whether this is the most effective way to use this money,
then that is noteworthy. If through using the research we have
described this morning, you may ask if we are getting enough for the
money we are spending. Then we might say it is worth it or we might
say the benefits of marriage are not as great as the big price tag we are
paying. I think that the reason to ask those questions is to inform
particular decisions.
PROF. THOMAS: Questions?
THE AUDIENCE: My first question goes to Professor
Kornhauser: What does a woman's money in the marriage have to do
with eliminating the marriage penalty? If we go back to having
married couples file single returns, we create the ability for those
couples to avoid taxes, maybe even evade taxes, through their
relationship as husband and wife.
PROF. KORNHAUSER: I do not think so. If the tax system
uses individual returns, all earned income would be taxed to the
person who earned it. Consequently, couples could not evade tax on
their earned income, which for most couples is the vast majority of
their income. An earner spouse would still be taxed on what he or she
earned, regardless of whether she gives it to the non-earner spouse and
regardless of how the non-earner uses it. As to unearned income, that
is a little more complicated. There are a couple of things I can say.
One, look at the estate and gift tax area; an area in which evasion
often occurs. The argument is that people lower their estate taxes by
giving away assets to their spouses. My response is that statistics
81 See Bella English, You Can Go Home Again, BOSTON GLOBE, June 23;
1998, at El (stating that research shows one-on-one attention benefits a baby's developing
brain).
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show that not as much of that transference happens as you would
think. This is because people want to retain control and want to retain
title to assets. The reason for this, as I indicated before, is that
complete sharing does not occur. Not as much evasion happens as
you would expect.
There are ways to deal with it to the extent it does occur. For
example, minimal amounts of assets transferred for tax purposes do
not matter. The code could allow shifting assets up to a certain
ceiling. Alternatively, the code could allocate unearned income in the
same proportion as earned income. For example, if the husband
earned 70 percent of the income, then 70 percent of the unearned
income would be attributable to him. Therefore, there are
administrative ways you can deal with tax motivated transfers and still
have a system based on the individual taxable unit. It would be more
respectful of the idea of ability to pay. There are also certain
provisions of the code that would still be in effect, such as Section 267
that deals with transactions between related parties to prevent false
losses.
THE AUDIENCE: My issue was flat tax. From what I
understand, you are advocating a flat tax. What happened in 1986 as a
social issue, both low income and poor were more affected by the
1986 Act than those who were in the position to pay the income tax.
82
PROF. SCHWARTZ: Under the flat tax system, advocated in
some bills, such as the bill by Congressman Armey, a family of four
who earns less than $36,000 would not pay any tax at all.8 3 In
addition, depending on who you wanted to exempt from these taxes,
you would set that at different levels so a number of people under the
flat tax proposal would be off the tax rolls completely. That is how
that particular aspect would be dealt with. One could certainly make
arguments for progressivity at different income levels. In that way
you can say that someone who earns $50,000 should pay more than
someone who earns $20,000, and that someone who earns $100,000
should pay more than someone who earns $50,000. The rationales for
82 See Heidi Glenn, Flat Tax Would Sting Low-Income Families, Study Finds,
72 TAx NoTEs 275 (1996) (explaining that a flat tax would disproportionately hurt low-
income taxpayers).
83 See H.R. 2060, 104th Cong. § 101 (1995).
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increasing progressivity vanish at increasing income levels. As such,
it does not seem to be a good theoretical argument as to why someone
who earns $200,000 should pay a lot more than someone who earns
$150,000. This assumes that we have dealt with the poorest members
of society, which is the goal of a progressive tax system in terms of
providing services and making sure that people at the bottom are
taken care of.
THE AUDIENCE: With the flat tax system there does not
seem to be any equity across the Country.
MS. FURCHTGOTT-ROTH: That is right and that is also true
of our Federal Tax system now. Our current Federal Tax system does
not take into account that different kinds of exemptions use different
rates that are worth a lot more in certain geographical areas, such as
Mississippi for example. An ideal tax code would adjust for those
geographical differences, but such adjustments are very difficult to
calculate and so far, have not been done.
PROF. THOMAS: I think there may be different views among
us, about progressivity among other things. But I would also like to
point out that there is an argument that even the flat tax is a two rate
system, if there is a zero bracket amount and most of the proposals
include a personal exemption or a family exemption.
84
MS. FURCHTGOTT-ROTH: And it is a defacto progressive
rate structure.
PROF. THOMAS: It may be, in fact, more progressive then
some other explicitly progressive systems. As such, we have to be a
little careful in thinking about how progressive a flat tax might be and,
even in this marriage penalty area, whether there are marriage
penalties built into the way the exclusion is constructed. Thank you.
84 See id.
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